McGill GLSA Research Series https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/ <p>The “McGill GLSA Research Series” is an annual publication after the <a href="https://www.mcgill.ca/agcl/">Graduate Law Student Association (GLSA) Conference</a>. As the conference is organised under a different theme every year, the theme of the publication will also change accordingly, apart from a section devoted to international law. In addition to the yearly publication, the “Research Series” also hopes to provide a space for publication of ‘Special issues’, devoted to the publication of proceedings after other events co-organised by the GLSA or with participation of McGill Law graduate students.</p> <p>To know more about McGill's GLSA please click <a href="https://www.mcgill.ca/law/grad-studies/glsa">here</a>.</p> en-US <p>Works are licensed under Creative Commons license “<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)</a>.”</p> <p>This license permits readers to <em>share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format under the following terms: Attribution — one must give appropriate credit, and provide a link to the license. Non Commercial — one may not use the material for commercial purposes. NoDerivatives — If one remixes, transforms, or builds upon the material, one may not distribute the modified material</em>.</p> vp-academic.glsa@mcgill.ca (Filzah Belal) escholarship.library@mcgill.ca (Jennifer Innes) Wed, 18 Sep 2024 15:26:25 -0400 OJS 3.3.0.13 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Law & Prejudice Journal Cover https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1400 Tanya Oberoi Copyright (c) 2024 Tanya Oberoi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1400 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Law as Prejudice: Codifying the Other https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1398 <p><em>Recalling the theme of the present Research Series Law and Prejudice, this closing article harnesses the conceptual framework proposed by Everett Zimmermann in his semantic analysis of “Pride and Prejudice” to examine the interplay between law, pride, and prejudice. In Zimmermann, “pride” and “prejudice” are both opposite and interconnected qualities, like communicating vessels characterized by the same egoistic “self” as their core. Transposing this analysis into the legal domain, the article explores how the law, akin to “pride,” can reproduce the latter’s characteristics of detachment and perceived superiority, ultimately facilitating attempts at codifying “prejudice.” In this dynamic, the law—through its normative power and façade of objectivity—can become an instrument of marginalization, segregation, and discrimination. </em></p> <p><em>This article contends that the law’s supposed objectivity and normative authority transform it into a tool of superiority, not unlike pride in Zimmermann. By examining this dynamic, the article reveals how the law has been used numerous times to justify and normalize prejudice, creating the paradigm of “law as prejudice,” beyond “law as pride.” Through the lens of “othering,” the article illustrates how the law segregates by codifying the differences between “the Self” and “the Other,” sometimes under the guise of protection or benevolence, thereby justifying exclusion and discrimination. The analysis is anchored in the case study of the Canadian settler policies of assimilation of Indigenous Peoples, which show the destructive normative power of the “law as prejudice” paradigm. The article offers insights into the complex relationship between law, pride, and prejudice, and the pivotal role of the egoistic Self as “lawmaker of othering.”</em></p> Isabella Spano Copyright (c) 2024 Isabella Spano https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1398 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Technological Prejudice: Demonstrating the Ontological Challenge of Building a Critical Theory of Artificial Legal Intelligence https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1090 <p class="paragraph" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 150%;"><em><span lang="EN-CA">This paper contributes to a theory of artificial legal intelligence (ALI) that harmonizes concerns for artificial intelligence (AI) bias and prejudice with 1) the critical perspective, and (2) Jacques Ellul’s critique of the “technological phenomenon”. Necessary to this contribution is an argument for the importance of ontology in understanding the multidimensionality of ALI, and critical theory’s ability to deal with this multidimensionality. First, the paper introduces critical theory and some of its tenets. My focus then is critical legal studies (CLS) and their contentious relationship with the ontological issue of instrumentality. I emphasize that one way a theory of ALI can engage with this critical theme is through an ontological classification of AI. I propose two classifications: AI as a tool and AI as an ideological phenomenon. <span class="normaltextrun">Each classification is attributive of a certain autonomy to AI and telling about a potentiality for domination a critical theory of ALI should </span>recognize, deconstruct, and challenge. Ellul’s argument that the technological phenomenon is “autonomous” informs this part of my argument. I then discuss the concept of “prejudice” and find that, considering the ontological classifications, prejudice is visible in more than one form. Although the “algorithmic bias” approach is adequate for AI as a tool, it does not account effectively for another form of prejudice rooted in technology. I call it technological prejudice.</span></em></p> Émile Chamberland Copyright (c) 2024 Émile Chamberland https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1090 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 The Future of Legal Education Will Be Queer https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1403 <p><em>This article explores how legal education can be made queer-er in the future. Drawing on personal experiences in law school, the author examines the potential of queering legal education to foster inclusivity and challenge heteronormative structures of learning and teaching. The article presents examples of spaces where queer approaches to teaching and learning may be deployed and examples of heteronormative, career-oriented, and individualistic practices in law school. Key themes of representation, non-futurity, failure, community, and utopia are employed to reveal biases inherent in various aspects of legal education, such as time, space, curriculum, faculty, and student experiences. Queer perspectives draw our attention to critically examine pervasive elements within law faculties such as productivity, excellence, adversarial processes, and individualism which prevent law schools from meaningfully integrating “outsider perspectives” such as queer theory. By embracing negativity, transgression, collectivity, and hope as philosophies of legal education, the author argues that law schools can provide students with the tools to articulate their relationship to the legal order in a more creative, politicized, and holistic manner. This article advocates for a future where law faculties actively embrace and integrate teachings from queer theory into their curriculum and pedagogical practices.</em></p> Marie Dry Copyright (c) 2024 Marie Dry https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1403 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Law and Prejudice – Does Family Law Work for the Whole Family? https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1404 <p><em>The Children Act 1989 stipulates that the welfare of the child shall be the court’s paramount consideration when making decisions about who a child should 'live with' and ‘spend time with’ (collectively known as child arrangements) in England and Wales. In the context of post-separation parenting, the court is also facing increased pressure from Fathers’ Rights groups to prioritize the child’s contact with the father. But where does this leave mothers in the decision-making process, and how does this affect the lives of mothers beyond separation? </em></p> <p><em>This paper focuses on separated mothers in England and Wales and examines whether, and to what extent, the life goals of separated mothers are impacted by orders made under Section 8 of the Children Act 1989. The author will review literature from England and Wales, Australia and the US - jurisdictions with similar approaches to post-separation parenting. Examining whether mothers can freely make decisions about their own lives when they are subjected to the obligations of a Section 8 Order, the paper argues that judicial outcomes may inadvertently have negative effects on the agency of mothers, that courts do not understand or take into consideration when making orders for their children. &nbsp;</em></p> <p><em>This contribution is significant because it highlights the assumptions about the ethic of care made by the courts, the human poverty for mothers that can be a result of court orders relating to children, and evidences the need for mother’s needs to be considered by the courts to a greater extent when they make orders under section 8 of the Children Act 1989.</em></p> Sarah Groszewski Copyright (c) 2024 Sarah Groszewski https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1404 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Dual Citizenship Among Diaspora Communities https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1077 <p><em>The new measures that States set up with regard to expatriates and diaspora communities have considerably strengthened the extraterritorial dimension of citizenship. Expatriates have long been transformative actors in their countries of origin: they foment atypical citizenship-granting practices and create renewed identities at home. Moreover, while diasporic States use the rhetoric of engaging the global nation, their policies often target specific populations abroad. Does it depend on what these populations can offer the home State? This also raises the question of how relevant diaspora politics, extraterritorial voting and the extension of citizenship rights beyond the borders of nation-states actually are, and how they can contribute to the ongoing transformation of national citizenship.</em></p> <p><em>Concerning the methodology, this paper will start by analysing the Italian case as an example of atypical granting of citizenship to many emigrants with particular connotations compared to other European countries. In fact, Italy permits natives who settled abroad, as well as persons who were once Italian citizens, residing in the territories that were part of the Italian territory subsequently ceded to the Republic of Yugoslavia, to regain Italian citizenship under certain conditions and, in general, if they are able to attest that none of their direct ancestors unequivocally renounced it. Moving East, this paper will then examine the case of Israel, principally anchored to its Law of Return, which dates back to the period of the idea of exclusive and territorial citizenship, and which still seems to bear witness to a religious heritage. Russian extraterritorial naturalization will conclude the macro-comparison as a way of “creating” new Russian citizens through compulsory “passportization”, which could be an instrument of ambiguous extraterritorial governance. For each of the above-mentioned countries, the paper will examine the normative bases, rules and basic principles, as well as the provisions enacted regulating the granting of citizenship to expatriates. The results will also be interpreted considering the differences in citizenship-granting policies between diaspora communities and other instances.</em></p> Eleonora Iannario Copyright (c) 2024 Eleonora Iannario https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1077 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 « Décartographier » la probation https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1074 <p><em>Dans le cadre de la série de conférences Droit et Préjugés, nous avons choisi de « décartographier » les clauses de probation imposées à un délinquant autiste Asperger dans l’affaire R. v. Hanssen afin de relever les présomptions (ou préjugés) qui accablent le sujet de droit neurodivergent; plus précisément la capacité qu’on prête au sujet de droit responsable à se disjoindre des déterminismes psycho-sociaux qui composent sa réalité vécue et à se déterminer, seul, par la seule force de sa Raison et de sa Volonté. En mettant en son centre la responsabilisation autonome du délinquant neurodivergent plutôt que ses besoins et sa vulnérabilité, la probation renforce le préjugé voulant qu’il n’en tient qu’au délinquant de se reprendre en main et que le bris répété de la loi n’est qu’une question de « mauvaise » volonté de sa part. Le projet de droit libéral – l’individu libre gouverné par la loi – apparaîtra à la suite de notre exégèse comme étant davantage un projet d’exclusion systématique de la myriade de déviations possibles de cette construction de l’Homme raisonnable; le projet de gouvernance par la loi en est un fait exclusivement à sa mesure.</em></p> <p><em>Grâce au recours à de nouveaux outils théoriques (la loi comme Carte de Boaventura de Sousa Santos, l’imaginaire social de Charles Taylor, le Chronotope de Mariana Valverde), nous allons pouvoir faire ressortir les formes d’oppression latentes et cachées qui accablent les personnes atteintes de troubles mentaux lorsqu’on leur impose une ordonnance de probation. Décartographier la carte-probation (à partir de ses éléments-caractéristiques, nommément son échelle, sa projection et sa légende) nous permettra de questionner le rôle de l’institution pénale dans la gestion de la sécurité et de nous demander s’il est possible d’imaginer des pratiques probatoires moins sévères et préjudiciables pour les délinquants socialement vulnérables. </em></p> Gabriel Lefebvre Copyright (c) 2024 Gabriel Lefebvre https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1074 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Les préjugés envers les personnes mineures comme frein à l'action climatique https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1068 <p><em>Le droit actuel accorde des droits aux personnes mineures qui concernent soit la capacité d’agir en matière de changements climatiques, soit le droit à un environnement sain. Cependant, il limite leur pouvoir d’exercer directement ces droits. Ces limitations découlent de la conception sociale de l’enfant, laquelle comporte sa part de préjugés. Deux objectifs peuvent être associés à des conceptions sociales de l’enfant parfois en tension, soit sa protection et la promotion de son autonomie. L’incapacité d’exercice de principe de la personne mineure, laquelle a été invoquée par la jurisprudence en matière d’action climatique, constitue une première limitation. L’incapacité de jouissance en matière de droit de vote en est une seconde. Tant les normes internationales que quasi-constitutionnelles permettent, cependant, de fournir des assises juridiques à une action climatique des enfants et des adolescents. </em></p> <p><em>Certaines normes déjà existantes permettent de favoriser l’action climatique des enfants et des adolescents; d’autres solutions à ce que nous concevons comme étant un problème nécessiteraient des modifications législatives. D’une part, une mise en œuvre concrète du droit à la participation prévu à la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant et l’exercice de recours par les représentants légaux des personnes mineures sont des moyens de favoriser l’action climatique des personnes mineures qui découlent du droit actuel. D’autre part, une modification du seuil d’âge requis pour l’obtention du droit de vote et la création d’une nouvelle exception à l’incapacité d’exercice de la personne mineure en matière d’action collective seraient des moyens d’écarter des obstacles à l’action climatique des jeunes nécessitant des modifications législatives. Nous concluons que la protection des personnes mineures pourra être réalisée au moyen d’une plus grande autonomie qui leur serait accordée.</em></p> Caroline Lepage Copyright (c) 2024 Caroline Lepage https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1068 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Pride and Prejudice in African Constitutional LAw: Cohesion or Exclusion from Global North Narratives https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1147 <p><em>“It is a truth universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife”. Typical of our ancestors, who in the nineteenth century, having the destiny of Africa in their hands, married the colonial masters to meet their social needs. Upon marrying, the latter prioritized the application of Northern constitutional cultures and principles to the detriment of pre-colonial legal orders. Thus, </em><em>I argue that mimicry of the legal order of the Global North has taken root in African constitutions and that it serves as a source of pride and prejudice for African states in the twenty-first century. By employing a theory of critical legal studies, a law and literature approach, a law and culture approach and a Third World approach to international law, I equate the constitutional principles of the Global North in the eighteenth century with the constitutional principles of the twenty-first century in Africa. This paper mainly analyzes constitutional principles like sovereignty, constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law as well as institutions such as constitutional courts in their role as arbiters in African constitutionalism. Furthermore, I will show that these principles originated in France, Great Britain, and the United States in the eighteenth century. Moreover, these principles have been beneficial for human development at the national level but have deprived African states of the power of choice; internationally. Therefore, I will propose strategic, institutional, and substantive changes in the African constitutional order and global power dynamics.</em></p> Mafo Ndibe Mankah Copyright (c) 2024 Mafo Ndibe Mankah https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1147 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Unpacking the Power of Legal Definition: Changing the Legal Narrative Around Sex Trafficking and Sex Work in Canada https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1089 <p><em>Human Trafficking is a growing crime worldwide, 71% of which is dominated by the crime of sex trafficking. With recent Canadian legal cases such as Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, there is growing debate about sex trafficking and sex work. This paper will discuss legal and societal prejudice against sex trafficking and sex work in Canada using prior research and will discuss current statistics surrounding sex trafficking, human trafficking prosecutions, and police responses to sex trafficking and sex work. Using a sociolegal lens, this article will discuss how society’s wide-ranging perceptions of sex work have influenced the law in recent decades, and how the law has come to shape society’s current legal and moral prejudice against sex trafficking and sex work. Further, this paper will discuss how these perceptions have helped or hindered the work of law enforcement, crown attorneys and judges and will discuss how the law is not evolving at the same pace as the crime of human trafficking.</em><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"></a></p> Holly Wood Copyright (c) 2024 Holly Wood https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1089 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Mind the Gap: Toussaint and the Reception of International Human Rights Law in Canada https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1088 <p><em>This article explores the reception of international human rights law (“IHRL”) in Canada and the enforcement gap that may arise when legislation is not passed expressly implementing human rights treaties that Canada has ratified. </em><em>Despite establishing a variety of interpretive methods that may result in Canada’s binding IHRL obligations having domestic effect even when they are not expressly implemented, Canadian courts have struggled to provide clear and consistent guidance on how IHRL applies in Canada. The selective approach in Canada to implementing legislatively IHRL obligations may give rise to an enforcement gap when rights individuals purportedly enjoy under international law are found to have no domestic effect.</em></p> <p><em>To demonstrate this gap, this article focuses on litigation brought by the late Nell Toussaint, who lived in Canada and was denied federal health insurance coverage when facing life-threatening medical conditions due to her then-irregular migrant status. Exploring Ms. Toussaint’s unsuccessful domestic claim that her rights to health, life, and non-discrimination were violated by Canada and her advocates’ ongoing efforts to ensure that Canada abides by the subsequent determination of the United Nations Human Rights Committee that Canada violated her rights to life and non-discrimination under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, this article demonstrates how not expressly implementing ratified human rights treaties can create a barrier to IHRL being effective domestically in Canada. </em></p> Karinne Lantz Copyright (c) 2024 Karinne Lantz https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1088 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 About the McGill GLSA Research Series https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1401 Tanya Oberoi Copyright (c) 2024 Tanya Oberoi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1401 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Contributors https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1402 Tanya Oberoi Copyright (c) 2024 Tanya Oberoi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1402 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400 Preface: Prejudice and the Law https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1399 Tanya Oberoi Copyright (c) 2024 Tanya Oberoi https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://glsars.library.mcgill.ca/article/view/1399 Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 -0400